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Abstract  
Risk-based management of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) projects has gained great attention in 
the related literature of the last decade. Risk management has been proposed as a potential way to 
deal with the ERP project complexity and improve the final effectiveness of the implementation 
process. Nevertheless, to approach an effective risk management process is an ambitious task for this 
kind of projects: in particular assessing the risks of ERP projects is a very complex problem. Due to 
the nature of the risk factors, in fact, strict interconnections and indirect effects on the project 
performance often occur; unfortunately implications of interdependency are usually underestimated 
because they are difficult to include in any risk assessment logic.  
This work shows how Colored Petri Nets (CPN) can be used to model and assess risk in ERP projects 
in order to deal with the problem of risk factor interdependences. The technique is presented through 
an application to a real case study. Findings show the impact of interdependence and indirect links 
among the risk factors for a valuable ranking of risks. Furthermore, results support the utility of CPN 
for risk factor modeling since it allows a more structured and systematic analysis of risk factors and 
supports the planning for more accurate risk management actions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) programs are integrated computer-based systems used to manage 
company-wise business processes. Their aim is to support the flow of information between all the 
business functions inside/outside the boundaries of the organization (Bidgoli & Hossein, 2004). 
Implementing ERP software is usually a complex and risky project which usually imposes significant 
changes on business processes and work practices (Mandal & Gunasekaran, 2003). Many factors 
contribute to the success of the introduction project (Wright & Wright, 2001; Aloini et al., 2007) but 
just a few of them are technology-related factors. Many others belong to different areas such as 
strategic planning, project management, communication and finance.  
Risk Management is considered as a possible way to support the introduction of complex information 
systems. Several authors (Wright & Wright, 2001; Kumar 2002; Tatsiopoulos et al., 2003; Aloini et 
al., 2007) studied Risk Management approaches in ERP field in order  to support the implementation 
project and improve the success rate of these projects. According to their perspective, Risk 
Management in ERP projects can enable to achieve an appropriate management of all the sources of 
uncertainty within the project. 
The main objective of this work is to develop a quantitative approach using CPNs to model ERP 
project risks and quantify project vulnerability for each risk factor including their interdependencies 
which is often a neglected issue in this topic. We show how the use of CPNs allows to include 
interdependences and indirect effect causalities into the final Risk Evaluation algorithm. This is a 
major benefit in the field of ERP Risk Management since it enables the elaboration of new quali-
quantitative risk indexes for project control and governance.  
2 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
The ERP project life cycle goes through a number of typical steps. The following Implementation 
Roadmap is one of the most used framework to model the project life cycle both in literature and in 
business practice (figure 1) (for further details see Monk and B. Wagner, 2006).  
. 
Figure 1. ERP Project life cycle (SAP Implementation Roadmap) 
 
Factors affecting an ERP implementation project spread around all the project phases (Al-Mashari et. 
al., 2003). Many empirical researches have focused the attention on their identification and 
classification (Sumner, 2000; Tatsiopoulos et al., 2003; Wright & Wright, 2002; Scott & Vessey, 
2002a; Yang et al., 2006). In a previous work, Aloini et al. (2007) reviewed a large number of articles 
about ERP system implementation from a Risk Management perspective identifying 19 risk factors 
and 10 project effects (figure 2) which we mainly refer to also in this work (due to the space limits we 
refer to the previous paper for a broader debate about the risk factors). 
Applying a Risk Management process to ERP projects has a strategic value since it allow us to 
formulate appropriate risk treatment strategies and actions in the early phase of the project. This can 
be really critical for a successful implementation. 
 
 
 Figure 2. Risk factors, effects and project failure macro-classes (Aloini et al., 2007). 
 
Formal, structured Risk Assessment methods are rarely applied to Risk Management in complex IT 
projects, such as the introduction of ERP systems. In a specific review on ERP “Risk Management”, 
Aloini et al. (2007) state that most of the contributions concentrate on the Risk Identification and 
Analysis stages in a rather descriptive fashion, while only a few suggest working models or techniques 
for the Risk Quantification or for defining appropriate treatment strategies. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Risk Management framework 
Refferring to the above mentioned framework (figure 3), this work deals with the Risk Assessment 
phase. Risk Assessment is a core step of the Risk Management process and usually includes: Risk 
Identification which allows the organization to early determine potential threats (internal and external 
risk factors) and their impact (effects) on the project success; and Risk Quantification which aims to 
prioritize risk factors according to their risk levels and consists of two main phases: Risk Analysis and 
Risk Evaluation. 
3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This work presents an innovative application of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to the Risk Assessment 
(RA) of an ERP project. It aims to provide a methodology including risk interdependence in the RA 
process by modeling and analyzing causal relationships among risk factors and between risk factors 
and effects.  
To our best knowledge, this is still a major gap in literature. Chapman and Ward (2002) stated that the 
most common shortcomings in terms of  potential cause of failure in Risk Management are often about 
a superficial Risk Analysis which misses Risk Interdependence Analysis; this is also valid within the 
ERP case. The complex structure of an ERP project and the high number of risk factors, in fact, 
increase the magnitude of risk not only referring to each single factor, but also to the interconnections 
between them. Such project risks are typically interdependent and, since interdependence does not 
require proximity, the antecedent to failure may be quite distinct and distant from actual disaster. For 
these reasons, before any Risk Assessment process, it is primary essential to understand and model 
risk factors including interdependencies in order to finally obtain a valuable ranking and an effectively 
guide project Risk Management activities.  
The use of CPN technique in the Risk Management process can help us to fill some of previously 
underpinned gaps in ERP Risk Management research. The work explains how CPNs can provide an 
effective support for the analysis and quantification of ERP risks. It firstly aims to develop and apply 
methodologies for a formal and systemic Risk Management to ERP projects and then to overcome a 
number of limitations of the current approaches including interdependence in the RM process. 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
CPNs can provide a useful support for the Risk Assessment process in order to assess the risk level of 
each risk factor correctly. The risk structure of an ERP project can be represented as a very complex 
net. As a consequence of the strong risk factor interdependence, a domino effect is likely to occur: the 
occurrence of a specific event in an early stage of the project could result in new emerging risk factors. 
For instance, a low commitment by the Top Management has usually an indirect effect on the 
involvement of the Key Users. As well, an inadequate selection of the project team skills can lead to 
wrong or underperforming Business Process Reengineering activities or also ineffective project 
management; finally, also communication problems can occur. 
As we stated before, this condition makes it essential to understand risk factor interdependencies and 
to include them in the Risk Assessment process. Unfortunately, this is often hard to do. In fact, it is 
difficult to include dependence in the occurrence probabilities when the probability and the associated 
consequences are not directly measurable. Moreover, in most cases, these issues are not estimated 
from statistically meaningful data but rely mainly on experts' opinions. 
Due to their flexibility and computational capability, CPNs can offer a great support in modelling risk 
factors. As a result, CPNs can provide interesting information on safety and reliability of the modelled 
system. Although the first applications of Petri Nets were mainly in Computer System and 
Communication area, later they have been extended to other fields such as Risk Management (e.g. 
risk, accident and system modeling) and SCM (Liu et al., 2007). Their large calculation capabilities, in 
fact, achieve to overcome a number of limitations of traditional methods in modeling complex systems 
(e.g. for the analysis of linear chain of events, branch or multilinear events, etc.). 
Since their introduction, Petri nets have shown their usefulness for many practical applications in 
different industries/research domains (David and Alla, 2000). Most of the benefits, compared with 
other system modelling techniques, are generally known in literature. Among the most advanced 
approaches developed in accident risk of safety-critical operations literature, for example, Labeau et 
al. (1994) make use of the compositional specification power of Petri nets to instantiate a model, and 
subsequently use stochastic analysis and Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the model. Chang and 
Luh (1997) and Lin and Lee (1997) argue that net models with individual tokens are useful especially 
for modelling different types of resources involved. Jensen (1997) presents a long list of advantages of 
CPNs. Many of them are valid in general for other kinds of high-level Petri Nets.  
However, the reasons that make CPNs useful for ERP Risk Assessment are: 
• High flexibility in dynamic system modelling: solving concurrency and interleaving problems, 
CPNs achieve to easily model complex-interconnected systems. CPNs also allow us to 
differentiate the system behaviour according to different classes of events. Thus, the system 
modelling is more effective and flexible. 
• Large number of formal analysis methods, which are potentially useful in a Risk Assessment 
process: occurrence graphs, calculation and interpretation of system invariants, reduction and 
checking of structural properties. 
Referring to Risk Assessment, four approaches are suitable in the use of Coloured/Petri nets: 
• System modelling. Petri Nets are used to model the behaviour of the system (e.g. a manufacturing 
process, a project, a software system etc.) 
• Accident modelling. Petri Nets model the accident sequence of a system. Combinations of events 
are systematically explored to get safety data. 
• State of space modelling. Petri nets are used for a calculation process more than a Risk Analysis. 
• Fault and event three modelling. It translates a known sequence of events (since the Risk 
Analysis has to be previously assessed) into a Petri net model.  
In this paper the accident modelling approach is chosen to achieve Risk Assessment of an ERP 
project. In such a context, the high variability of possible project configurations makes modelling the 
risks more effective than modelling the project activities. The CPN extension is here adopted in order 
to mark and track each risk factor and its impact on effects.  According to this research perspective, 
using CPNs in Risk Management for IS project is a rather new topic. To our best knowledge Petri Nets 
application in IS field are mainly oriented to system requirement definition and/or optimization. 
Project management, performance and Risk Management issues are not analyzed conjointly in IS field 
and risks are usually addressed from an economic-financial perspective or from a software 
development point of view rather than from a project view. 
5 CASE STUDY 
The methodology was applied in an explorative attempt to support the Risk Assessment in a real ERP 
project. The case study regards a multinational company operating in the field of Electric Power 
Systems and Alternative Energy Systems. In recent decades the company, one of the world's leading 
manufacturers of power-conversion equipment for the telecommunications, networking, and 
technology markets, has undergone impressive expansion due to core business growth and the 
penetration of new markets, including entry into new application fields fostered by several 
acquisitions. Therefore, an “IT Re-alignment” project was launched in order to homogenize the 
information and procedural structures of the new plants with the existing corporate ones. This project 
also included the implementation of a new ERP system (Oracle). 
The case study develops according to the following 3 main steps: Data collection (which includes the 
identification of risk factors/effects and the detection of the links between risk factors and effects); 
Modeling the risk net; Simulations and Analysis of results. 
5.1 Data collection 
In order to identify the major project risks to be included in the model, the phase in which they 
potentially occur and their related effects, we conducted a series of interviews and meetings with the 
implementation project team of the company. Some members of the implementation team (Table 1) 
were selected and a structured interview format was defined and followed for each one. A Delphi-
based process was also adopted in order to achieve convergence of the experts’ judgments.  
ID. Position Role in the ERP project team 
Time with company  
(years) 
Number of 
previous ERP project 
1.  Senior Production Manager Project Manager More than 10 years 2 
2.  Financial Manager Financial Analyst Less than 1 year 6 
3.  IT Manager Super User Less than 1 year 6 
4.  Traffic Manager Super User Less than 1 year 0 
5.  Chief Accountant Super User 5 years 0 
6.  Sourcing Manager Super User 5 years  
7.  Planning Super User 6 years 0 
8.  Manufacturing Engineering Manager Super User 6 years 1 
9.   Quality Manager Super User More than 10 years 1 
10.  Production Planner Super User Less than 1 year 0 
Table 1. Interviewed subjects 
Each participant was asked to identify the experienced risk factors among a pre-defined list (figure 2) 
and to indicate the potential phase of occurrence. The same procedure was followed to identify the risk 
effects (figure 2). Respondents validated and agreed with all the risk factors reported in the list. They 
also indicated the related project phase. Table 2 shows the enabled risk factors according to the project 
phase. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
R1 
R2 
R3 
R4 
- 
- 
R7 
- 
R9 
R10 
- 
- 
R13 
R14 
R15 
- 
- 
R18 
R19 
-
R2 
R3 
R4 
R5 
R6 
R7 
R8 
R9 
R10 
R11 
R12 
R13 
R14 
R15 
- 
- 
R18 
R19 
-
R2 
R3 
- 
R5 
R6 
R7 
R8 
R9 
R10 
R11 
R12 
R13 
R14 
R15 
R16 
R17 
R18 
R19 
-
- 
R3 
R4 
R5 
R6 
R7 
R8 
R9 
R10 
R11 
R12 
R13 
R14 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
R7 
- 
R9 
- 
R11 
R12 
R13 
R14 
- 
R16 
R17 
- 
- 
Table 2. Enabled risk factors and project stages 
We also asked the project team to qualitatively assess the strength of inter-connections among the risk 
factors and between the risk factors and effects. Respondents were asked to quantify the relationships 
by a weight from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). Then, the judgments of the experts were elaborated in 
order to define a unique map of relationships and the process was reiterated until a consensus was 
reached and all problems solved. 
5.2 Modeling the risk net 
Information gathered by respondents was used to model the risk network of the project by a CPN. 
Figure 4 illustrates the theoretical model of the project risk net. We used different types of places and 
transitions: 
• Phase places (F1, ..., F5) define the current project phase and enable risk places. When a phase 
place is running, the enabled (linked) risk can receive a token. The phase places are synchronized 
and the phase duration are fixed according to the number of the available tokens.  
• Risk places (R1, ..., R19) represent the occurrence of a risk factor. We modelled each risk factor 
as a state place with multiple potential inputs and outputs. A risk place can get two kinds of 
inputs: one from the phase place (activation token) otherwise from another risk place of the 
current phase. It can finally generate two kinds of output: the first is a transition risk-risk which 
activates another risk factor as previously stated, the second is a risk-effect transition which 
produces a direct impact on the project performance. Depending on this, a risk factor can get a 
direct or an indirect effect on the project performance. The indirect effect is caused and mediated 
by other risk factors. 
 
Figure 4.  Theoretical model of the project risk net 
Our main assumption is that in each phase the enabled risk factors have the same probability to occur. 
However this is not a main concern since the aim of the work is to investigate interdependences and to 
include interdependence and indirect effects into the final Risk Evaluation algorithm. 
• Effect places (E1, ..., E10) represent the occurrence of a risk effect on the project. The effect 
place counts the number of tokens which arrive to the place. It also takes into account the colour 
of each token. They provide valuable information to synthesize the desired risk measures. 
• Transitions T_Fn_Rn activate risk factors during a specific project phase and assign a colour to 
the risk token marking the risk factors. When a colour is assigned it never changes. 
As we stated before, a risk place can generate two kinds of output transitions: Transitions T_Rn_Rn 
and T_Rn_En. 
• Transitions T_Rn_Rn model risk factor inter-connections.  
• Transitions T_Rn_En model risk factors-effects causal links. 
These transitions have not the same probability to occur. On the contrary, they take into account the 
qualitative judgment of experts about the risk causality (see appendix A). The higher the strength of 
the causal link, the lower the number of token which are needed to activate the transition. Finally, the 
occurrence of a transition does not distinguish about the token colour. The final model consists of 38 
places (drawn as circle), 323 transitions (drawn as rectangular boxes), and a number of directed arcs 
connecting places and transitions. Places can be marked with one or more tokens, and each token has a 
label (colour) indicating the risk. Transitions, instead, are branded by specific weights which define 
how many tokens for each colour are necessary to occur. In order to implement the model and perform 
the simulations we selected the package “CPN tool”. CPN Tool is a software for editing, simulating 
and analysing untimed and timed, hierarchical CPNs (CPN2000 project, University of Aarhus). It 
combines powerful functionalities with a flexible user interface, containing improved interaction 
techniques, as well as different types of graphical feedback which keep the user informed of the status 
of syntax checks, simulations, etc. (Ratzer et al., 2003).  
5.3 Simulation and Analysis of results  
A Petri net simulation analysis was conducted to evaluate a ranking of the project risk factors. Three 
scenarios (S1, S2, S3) were set according to a different length of the project phases in order (1) to 
consider the impact of different phase durations into the risk model, (2) to test model sensitivity to the 
phase length and (3) to achieve convergence. One thousand independent replications for each scenario 
were performed during the simulation. In each run, the risk project net was loaded with a number of 
tokens which is proportional to the duration of each phase. Phase were synchronized, as well. Each run 
produced one observation of the token distribution in the different risk effects. According to the three 
scenarios, the occurrence frequency of  the 19 risk factors was observed for each class of effect and a 
final ranking was elaborated. 
Findings reveal the potential significant impact of risk factor interdependence on the hazard 
evaluation. As usually happens in many Risk Assessment methods, event frequency was used to 
calculate the top event occurrence. Event frequency was computed in order to provide a final ranking 
of the risk factors and enable the calculation of  dependence indexes to be included in the global Risk 
Assessment process. This is necessary in order to provide a complete and effective evaluation of risks, 
for example considering risk factor interdependence in the RPN evaluation (FMECA Risk Priority 
Number). For instance, we could modify the FMEA standard RPN index including a proxy indicator 
of the interdependence between each risk factor and the other ones. This would allow considering risk 
factor interdependence in the final RPN evaluation.  
 
Frequency (%)
Dependence  
Impact Index 
Dependence  
Impact Class
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 From 1 to 5 
R7 7.3 7.6 7.5 0.09 0.09 0.08 5 
R9 7.1 7.3 7.4 0.08 0.08 0.08 5 
R13 6.9 7.1 7.3 0.08 0.08 0.08 5 
R14 7.0 7.2 7.3 0.08 0.08 0.08 5 
R11 6.1 6.5 6.6 0.07 0.07 0.07 3 
R10 5.7 5.9 6.0 0.07 0.07 0.07 3 
R3 5.3 5.7 5.8 0.06 0.06 0.06 2 
R8 5.0 5.2 5.2 0.06 0.06 0.06 2 
R6 4.9 5.0 5.1 0.06 0.06 0.06 2 
R5 4.3 4.5 4.6 0.05 0.05 0.05 2 
R4 3.7 4.0 4.0 0.04 0.05 0.04 2 
R2 3.6 3.7 3.8 0.04 0.04 0.04 2 
R15 3.5 3.7 3.8 0.04 0.04 0.04 2 
R19 3.6 3.7 3.8 0.04 0.04 0.04 2 
R18 3.3 3.5 3.5 0.04 0.04 0.04 2 
R16 3.0 3.2 3.3 0.04 0.04 0.04 2 
R17 2.9 3.2 3.3 0.03 0.04 0.04 4 
R1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 
R12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
Table 3. Overall risk factors Frequencies, DII and DIC  
Table 3 shows the global output for the three scenarios (frequency is computed globally for all the 
project stages). An overall Dependence Impact Index (DII) is then calculated as a ratio of the risk 
factor frequency and the sum of frequencies for all the enabled risks. Risk factors were finally 
clustered according to their dependence risk index into five classes.  
The present analysis ranks the risks considering only the impact of interdependence among risk factors 
and between risk factors and effects for the global project risk, and excluding any other information of 
the independent occurrence probability of each risk factor and severity of effects. 
Despite conclusive indications cannot be achieved since generalization is obviously compromised by 
the nature of the case study which is mostly demonstrative/explorative, interesting information can be 
gathered comparing the case study results with evidences from literature. We can notice that the most 
relevant risks reported in the case study are: R7 (Complex architecture and high number of 
implementation modules), R9 (Poor managerial conduct), R13 (Ineffective consulting services) and 
R14 (Poor leadership). These risk factors seem to be the most critical issue in terms of 
interdependencies. Findings contrasts with CSF-ERP risk related literature (Huang et al., 2004; 
Zafiropoulos et al., 2005; Aloini et al., 2007). Among the most cited RFs, in fact, we often find: 
inadequate ERP selection, ineffective strategic thinking and planning, ineffective  project management 
techniques, bad managerial conduct, and inadequate change management (Table 4). It is evident that 
these factors are not coherent with the actual results of the dependence analysis. However, we cannot 
affirm that dependence dimension is more relevant/important than the other ones such as the 
likelihood of occurrence or the severity of effects due to a risk factor. The significant difference 
between these two class of results over-stresses the importance of considering also the dependence 
effect in the final risk evaluation since “Dependence” could differently contribute to the final risk 
ranking and modify the expected output. 
 
ID Risk factor  Rate Life cycle phase 
R1 Inadequate selection  36 Concept/Selection 
R18 Ineffective strategic thinking and planning  31 Concept/Strategic Planning 
R10 Ineffective project management techniques 27 Implementation/Deployment 
R9 Poor  managerial conduct 24 Concept/Strategic Planning 
R11 Inadequate change management  24 Implementation/Integration 
R6 Inadequate training and instruction  24 Implementation/Integration 
R2 Poor project team skills 23 Concept/Selection 
R8 Inadequate BPR  22 Concept/Strategic Planning 
R3 Low top management involvement  20 Concept/Strategic Planning 
R5 Low key user involvement  19 Concept/Selection 
Table 4. Top ten risk factors (source: Aloini et al., 2007) 
 
The following graphs in figure 5 shows measured risk factor frequencies for each project phase. Here, 
relative frequencies of risk factors are computed taking into consideration tokens which are enabled in 
each project stage. Partial rankings are sensibly different in each phases. In phase 1 the top risk factor 
is the Inadequate Selection (R1), in the second phase Ineffective communications system (R4), in the 
third one Inadequate IT system issue (R15), in phase 4, instead, the most frequent risk factors are 
Inadequate training and instruction (R8) and Inadequate BPR (R6), as well in phase 5 Poor managerial 
conduct (R7). Whether not generalizable, this information can be useful to managers in order to 
differentiate the risk management strategy and the treatment actions according to a specific project 
phase. 
Figure 5.  Measured risk factor frequencies for each project phase.                                                      
(Blue point - S1; Red point –S2; Green point –S3) 
 
Finally, figure 6 shows the partial ranking of the risk factors for each project stage (in the scenario S3). 
The figure clearly shows that the risk frequency (when a risk becomes evident/manifest and have an 
effect on the project) significantly increases in the last phase of the project. This is coherent with the 
effect of interdependence. Since risk factors can enable other risks in the project and the system has its 
own memory,  many risks which has been cumulating during the previous project finally happens 
during the latest stages of the project (such as phase 5). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Ranking of the risk factors for each project phase (Scenario S3) 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this article we presented an innovative approach to obtain a more systematic evaluation of risks 
within an ERP project. At its heart we used CPN theory to model and structure the relationships 
among risks factors, and between risk factors and effects, and to convert them to quantitative indexes 
of dependence. This is a first attempt to apply Petri nets to the Risk Assessment process in this class of 
projects. Formal Risk Assessment methods, in fact, are rarely applied for Risk Management in 
complex IT projects such as ERP introduction. The research hints at the advantage of including “risk 
dependence” in the Risk Evaluation algorithm in order to support managers in Risk Quantification and 
mitigation activities. It also starts closing an existent gap that exists in ERP Risk Management since 
contributions in Operational Risk Management which investigate and model risk factors 
interdependencies are, at our best knowledge, absent in ERP literature. While some (very few) authors, 
in fact, suggests conceptual relationships between ERP CSF, nobody have tried to model these 
interdependencies into a broader model of risks to be used in a risk assessments process. The choice of 
using CPN has got value also in this sense allowing to model a very complex systems (the ERP 
implantation project). An exploratory case study was also presented to demonstrate the utility and 
applicability of CPNs in this field. Results support the value of the technique to synthesize dependence 
indexes and show the strengths of the technique in risk factor modeling. Furthermore, simulations 
highlight the relevance of the indirect links for a valuable ranking of risks in respect to the classical 
approaches presented in literature.  
Despite these merits, the research is not without limitations. The main limitation of this work concerns 
with its exploratory nature. This condition does not allow to attempt any generalization of the results 
but provides evidence of the applicability of CPN technique and its potential in this field. Other 
critical factors are the data availability and the quality of the value of expert judgments in respect to 
the project risk relationships. Future research should investigate new ways and means of obtaining 
data and determine if the expert judgment is a good estimator of unobservable relationships. In 
addition, a  main assumption of this work is that RFs, which are enabled in a project phase, have the 
same probability to occur. For this reason the final ranking of risks does not take into account the 
unconditional occurrence probability of each risk factor. Whether this does not impact on the purpose 
of investigating the role of interdependence, further developments should aim to overcome this 
limitation integrating dependence and unconditional probabilities in the Risk Evaluation algorithm.   
Finally, another important direction for future research concerns the validation and refinement of the 
method and its inclusion in a formal ERP Risk Management tool. In this regard, Action Research 
seems to be a promising approach, since it is well suited to the aims of providing an effective, practical 
means to improve the development and test such methodologies.  
On the whole, this research sets a step ahead towards a more quantitative method for Risk 
Management of an ERP project. Managers should continuatively assess risks in order to improve the 
final project performance and achieve the project success. A more complete and correct assessment of 
the risk using CPN theory can support their efforts.  
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